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EVIDENTIARY EFFECT OF A TRIAL JUDGE'S VIEw
OF PROPERTY IN A CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING
Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency
- R.L -, 294 A.2d 387 (1972)
The Providence Redevelopment Agency appropriated petitioner's
property pursuant to its powers of eminent domain.' Petitioner insti-
tuted an action to assess his damages.2 At trial, the defendant agency's
expert appraiser valued the property at $10,400. Petitioner introduced
no direct evidence as to value. The trial court, sitting without a jury,
assessed damages at $16,000, based on the location of the land, its
income value, pictures of the land, and the court's "view" of the subject
1. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 45-32-5(d) (1971):
Each redevelopment agency shall constitute a public body, corporate and
politic, exercising public and essential governmental functions, and shall have
all the powers necessary and convenient to carry out and effectuate the pur-
poses and provisions of chapters 31 to 33, inclusive, of this title, including the
powers enumerated in this section in addition to others granted by said chap-
ters.
(d) . . .to acquire by the exercise of the power of eminent domain any real
property or any estate or interest therein ....
2. Id. § 45-32-34:
Trial by court on damages.-Any owner of or persons entitled to any estate
or interest in any part of the real property, and who cannot agree with said
agency for the price of the real property, or estate or interest therein, so taken,
may within three (3) months after notice of said taking, or, if he has no
notice, may within one (1) year from the first publication of the copy of such
resolution and declaration referred to in this chapter, apply by petition to the
superior court in and for the county in which such real property lies, setting
forth the taking of his real property or estate or interest therein, and praying
for an assessment of damages.
Eminent domain power may be exercised only for a public use, i.e. a use by the gov-
ernment for a legitimate governmental purpose. See generally W. EBENsrn, LAw
oF PuBmuc HousiNG 37-38 (1940). The fifth amendment of the United States Consti-
tution requires that compensation be made to owners of property taken under power
of eminent domain: ". . . nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." This requirement has been applied to state eminent domain ac-
tions under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). "Just compensation" generally has been con-
strued to mean the fair market value of the property taken. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S.
609 (1963); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States
v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946). See also Note, Eminent Domain: Ohio
Evidentiary Aspects in Ascertaining Market Value, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 1687, 1687-90
(1967).
3. Wigmore defined a "view" as the procedure in which the court goes to an
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property.4 The agency appealed on the ground that no evidence in the
record would support an award that exceeded the highest expert ap-
praisal by $5,600. 5 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
reversed and held: The trial court's divergence from the uncontradicted
expert appraisal" of the condemned land's value, based in whole or
object in its place and observes it. A view is used when the object cannot be produced
in court or when it is inconvenient to remove the object from its setting. 4 J. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1162 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1972) [hereinafter cited as WIOMORE].
4. Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, - R.I. -, - 294 A.2d 387,
390 (1972).
5. A trial court's finding of value generally will not be disturbed on appeal unless
it is shown either that the court adopted an erroneous theory of valuation or that the
trial court's exclusion of competent evidence or admission of incompetent evidence
impaired the rights of one of the parties. A. JAHR, LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN VALUA-
TMON AND PROCEDURE 428 (1953); 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN § 130 (2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as OROEL]. See also Nugent v.
City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518, 238 A.2d 758 (1968) (irrelevant evidence is
ground for reversal only where it prejudicially influences the trial court in its deter-
mination of the issue in the case).
6. The American Law Institute defined an "expert witness" in the following
manner:
A witness is an expert witness and is qualified to give expert testimony if the
judge finds that to perceive, know, or understand the matter concerning which
the witness is to testify requires special knowledge, skill, experience, or train-
ing, and that the witness has the requisite special knowledge, skill, experience
or training.
ALI CODE OF EvIDENcE 123 (Proposed Final Draft, 1942). See also 2 E. MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 197 (1954).
Most courts treat expert testimony as merely advisory and hence not controlling on
the fact-finder. United States v. 412.93 Acres of Land, 455 F.2d 1242 (3d Cir. 1972);
Louisiana v. McPheron, 259 So. 2d 33 (La. 1972); In re Bruckner Expressway, 37
App. Div. 2d 541, 322 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1971); Schey Enterprises, Inc. v. State, 52
Wis. 2d 361, 190 N.W.2d 149 (1971). This reluctance to treat the testimony as con-
trolling arises out of a belief that to do so would usurp the jury's role. See Ladd,
Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REv. 414 (1952); McCormick, Some Observations Upon
the Opinion Rule and Expert Testimony, 23 TEXAs L. REv. 109, 117 (1945); Rosenthal,
The Development of the Use of Expert Testimony, 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PRon. 403, 417
(1935); Note, Expert Testimony as an "Invasion of the Province of the Jury," 26 IowA
L. REv. 819 (1941); cf. Jones v. City of Caldwell, 20 Idaho 35, 116 P. 110 (1911);
Olena v. Standard Oil Co., 82 N.H. 408, 135 A. 27 (1926). If, however, the expert
testimony is uncontradicted, it is generally held to be conclusive. See, e.g., Stafos v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 367 F.2d 314, 317 (10th Cir. 1966); Mantanoya v. Bratlie, 33
Cal. 2d 120, 127, 199 P.2d 677, 681 (1948); People v. Harvey, 286 Ill. 593, 604, 122
N.E. 138, 143 (1919).
The Rhode Island courts have long recognized as a well-settled rule of law the propo-
sition that the trier of fact must accept completely uncontradicted and unimpeached
testimony as conclusive of the fact it was introduced to prove. Gorman v. Hand
Brewing Co., 28 R.I. 180, 66 A. 209 (1907). See also Somerset Realty Co. v. Shapiro,
51 R.I. 417, 155 A. 360 (1931); Halliday v. Rhode Island Co., 42 R.I. 350, 107 A. 86
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substantial part on a view of the property taken by the court, was
prejudicial error.7
It is common in eminent domain proceedings for the jury to view
the condemned premises." Authority on the evidentiary effect of the
view, however, is conflicting. A majority of jurisdictions hold that a
view constitutes at least some evidence of the fair market value of the
particular property." Some jurisdictions recognize a view as indepen-
dent evidence that may provide the basis for an award without regard to
other evidence in the case.'" Other jurisdictions, including Rhode
Island, hold that a view does not constitute evidence," since impres-
(1919). This rule does not apply, however, if there is any evidence on the issue of
value other than the expert appraisal.
Moreover, a trial judge in Rhode Island is permitted to impeach expert testimony
based upon his observations of the witness' demeanor. Johnson v. Providence Rede-
velopment Agency, 96 R.I. 139, 189 A.2d 814 (1963). The expert's testimony also may
be impeached if it is improbable or inherently contradictory. See Jackowitz v. De-
slauriers, 91 R.I. 269, 274-75, 162 A.2d 528, 530 (1960); Walsh-Kaiser Co. v. Della
Morte, 76 R.I. 325, 69 A.2d 689 (1949); Gorman v. Hand Brewing Co., 28 R.I. 180,
66 A. 209 (1907). Thus, in Corrado, the court noted that the trial judge had impeached
the testimony of the agency's expert appraiser. In allowing this impeachment, the court
in effect said that if a trial judge prefers not to accept otherwise uncontradicted expert
testimony on value, he may do so at will, the assumption on review being that the
trial judge has impeached the testimony for one of the reasons mentioned above.
Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, - R. -, -, 294 A.2d 387, 391
(1972). At least one author has suggested that the better reasoned rule would be that
expert testimony in eminent domain-condemnation proceedings should not be controlling
per se whether contradicted or not. See J. LAWSON, THE LAW OF EXPERT AND OPINION
EVIDENCE 240 (1883). See also notes 17-20 infra and accompanying text. But see
Note, Valuation of Real Property-Role of the Expert Witness, 44 WASH. L. REv. 687
(1969), for a discussion of the proposition that greater reliance should be placed on
expert testimony in eminent domain proceedings. In effect, however, the rule in Rhode
Island already is that expert testimony as to value is not necessarily controlling,
because the trial judge apparently may impeach the testimony at will.
7. Corrado v. Providence Redevelopment Agency, - R.I. -, 294 A.2d 387
(1972).
8. For historical discussions of view, see 4 WIGmORE § 1163; Yeary v. Holbrook,
171 Va. 266, 198 S.E. 441 (1938).
9. See, e.g., Pierson v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1961); Farrington
v. Maine State Highway Comm'n, 159 Me. 95, 188 A.2d 483 (1963); Chaloupka v.
State Dep't of Roads, 176 Neb. 746, 127 N.W.2d 291 (1964); Board of Comm'rs v.
Gardner, 57 N.M. 578, 260 P.2d 682 (1953).
10. See, e.g., United States v. 76,800 Acres of Land, 46 F. Supp. 102 (S.D. Ga.
1942); Whitman v. Housing Author., 272 Ala. 245, 130 So. 2d 362 (1961); Otey v.
Carmel Sanitary Dist., 219 Cal. 310, 26 P.2d 308 (1933); Louisville & N.R.R. v. White
Villa Club, 155 Ky. 452, 159 S.W. 983 (1913).
11. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. 13 Acres of Land, 50 Del. 387, 131 A.2d 180
(1957); State v. Anderson, 92 Mont. 313, 13 P.2d 228 (1932); State v. Frazier, 101
R.I. 156, 221 A.2d 468 (1966); Reitzel v. Cary, 66 R.I. 418, 19 A.2d 760 (1941).
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sions of the trier of fact are not included in the record for appellate
review.12  These latter jurisdictions still permit a view, however, in
order to aid the jury in understanding the testimony and in applying
that testimony to the issue of value.13
Some commentators urge that a view should be controlling evidence
in an eminent domain proceeding.' 4 However, they base this conclu-
sion on an analysis of the land's physical characteristics only, disre-
garding other possible indices of the land's value.'3 While a view may
well be controlling as to whether a particular parcel of land is swamp-
land or rolling hillside,'6 it does not provide by itself the "quantitative
data necessary for a pecuniary estimate of value."'1T The better rea-
soned position, therefore, recognizes that a view is merely one form of
"real evidence!" that enables the trier of fact to see the land directly,
12. Jeffersonville, M. & I.R.R. v. Brown, 40 Ind. 545 (1872); Schey Enterprises,
Inc. v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 361, 190 N.W.2d 149 (1971).
13. State v. Frazier, 101 R.I. 156, 221 A.2d 468 (1966); D'Acchioli v. Cairo, 87
R.I. 345, 141 A.2d 269 (1958); Reitzel v. Carey, 66 R.I. 418, 19 A.2d 760 (1941).
14. See 3 B. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EvDENcn § 1412 (2d ed. J.
Henderson 1926); 4 WIGMORE § 1168.
15. The analysis is based on a variation of a hypothetical fact situation in which
the issue is whether a parcel of land is swampland or rolling hillside. All testimony
indicates that the land is swampland, but the jury view reveals that the land is actually
hillside. See note 23 inIra. In similar cases the courts have held that "upon reason
and authority, knowledge gained from a view of the premises is independent evidence."
Hatton v. Gregg, 4 Cal. App. 537, 88 P. 592 (1906). See also Parks v. Boston, 32
Mass. (15 Pick.) 198, 209-10 (1834).
16. See note 15 supra.
17. ORGEL § 129.
In most cases where there has been both expert testimony and a view of the premises,
damages have been assessed within the range of values presented by the expert testi-
mony. See, e.g., United States v. Seufert Bros. Co., 87 F. 35 (C.C. Ore. 1898); Taylor
v. State Highway Comm'n, 182 Kan. 397, 320 P.2d 832 (1958); Commonwealth Dep't
of Highways v. Heath, 354 S.W.2d 752 (Ky. 1962); Portland v. Ruggero, 231 Ore. 624,
373 P.2d 970 (1962); Chesapeake & O.R.R. v. Johnson, 137 W. Va. 19, 69 S.E.
2d 393 (1952). In verdicts, affirmed on appeal, that awarded damages outside the
range of values presented in testimony, the courts generally have found some evidence
other than the view on which the award might have been based. See, e.g., Murray v.
United States, 130 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1942); People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v.
Bond, 231 Cal. App. 2d 435, 41 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1964); Housing Author. v. Schroeder,
113 Ga. App. 432, 148 S.E.2d 188, rev'd on other grounds, 222 Ga. 417, 151 S.E.2d
226 (1966). But see Houston v. Highway Comm'r, 152 Conn. 557, 558, 210 A.2d 176,
177 (1965); Pierson v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1961); Grand Rapids v.
Perkins, 78 Mich. 93, 43 N.W. 1037 (1889); Wagner v. State, Dep't of Roads, 176 Neb.
589, 126 N.W.2d 853 (1964); Creasy v. Commonwealth, 39 Pa. D. & C.2d 12 (C.P.
Allegheny County 1965).
18. For a discussion of "real evidence," see 4 WicMoan §§ 1150-51.
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thereby avoiding the need to rely on the testimony of witnesses. 19 Con-
sequently, a view merely takes the place of a verbal description of the
property and should not, therefore, serve as the sole basis for an award.
Courts that deny evidentiary status to a view fail to recognize that
there is no practical way of limiting a jury's use of facts observed on a
view to merely understanding and applying testimony.20 In estimating
just compensation, no amount of "judicial exhortation" will prevent a
jury from giving greater weight to "the evidence of their senses than to
the statements of witnesses."'21
Furthermore, fair market value is an ambiguous legal standard which
is not readily ascertainable by reliance on expert testimony alone. 22
While objective in theory, the standard in practice results in as many
different "fair market" values for a given parcel of land as there are
appraisals of it, with condemnors minimizing, and condemnees exag-
gerating, the property's value. 23  Thus, since the issue of value is not
19. ORGEL. § 129.
20. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
21. ORGEL § 129. See also 4 WIGMoRE § 1168:
[I]t is wholly incorrect in principle to suppose that an autoptic inspection by
the tribunal does not supply it with evidence; for, although that which is re-
ceived is neither testimonial nor circumstantial evidence, nevertheless it is an
even more direct and satisfactory source of proof, whether it be termed "evi-
dence" or not. . . . The suggestion that, in a view or any other mode of
inspection by the jury, they are merely "enabled better to comprehend the
testimony," and do not consult an additional source of knowledge, is simply
not correct in fact.
22. See Bigham, "Fair Market Value," "Just Compensation," and the Constitution:
A Critical View, 24 VAND. L. REv. 63, 90 (1970).
23. Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental
Losses, 67 YAtE L.J. 61, 73 (1957).
A 1932 study of condemnation cases in New York City revealed that expert ap-
praisals made for the condemnors and the condemnees varied, in the average case, by
nearly one hundred percent. WALLSTE N, REPORT ON LAW AND PROCEDURE IN CON-
DPMNATION at iv (1932), cited in Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of
Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 73 n.53 (1957). In cases where
the condemnor offered more than one expert appraisal, those valuations varied by an
average of thirty-two percent. Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Rede-
velopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 73 n.55 (1957).
For striking examples of the variance to be found between expert estimates of value
in particular takings, see Oklahoma City v. Wilson, 310 P.2d 369, 372 (Okla. 1957)
(condemnor's appraiser-$4,200; condemnee's appraiser-$42,400); Reeves v. City of
Dallas, 195 S.W.2d 575, 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) ($1,000 against $100,000). See also
United States v. 37.15 Acres of Land, 77 F. Supp. 798, 801 (S.D. Cal. 1948): "I
cannot help but conclude that there is an excess minimization of values on the one
side and over enthusiasm on the other-a phenomenon not untypical of condemnation
cases."
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so completely esoteric as to make a layman's opinion worthless, a view
of the premises truly may be helpful in arriving at a just result. Indeed,
under the present system, juries and judges often simply "split the
difference" between the claims of the condemnor and condemnee,2"
thereby creating a potential for injustice to the condemnee if he fails to
provide his own expert appraiser. 25
Given the ambiguous nature of the fair market value standard, the
Corrado court arguably should have taken a more liberal position on con-
demnation awards. Although it would be improper for the trier of
fact to base its award solely on a view of the property,20 the trial court
in Corrado had other evidence on which to base its verdict.27
Moreover, the Corrado court's treatment of a view appears incon-
sistent with its position on the impeachment of witnesses. The court
allowed the trial judge to impeach the testimony of the agency's expert
appraiser based on the witness' manner and demeanor.28 If, however,
a view is not considered evidence because the court's impressions do
not appear in the record, allowing impeachment based upon the trial
judge's impressions of the witness,20 which also do not appear in the
record, contradicts that rationale. 0
By holding that a view is not evidence of any fact, and resting its
reversal on the trial court's divergence from the expert appraisal, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island has promoted the unrealistic theorx, that
value is objectively ascertainable.31 The court should have recognized
24. Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental
Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 87 (1957).
Condemnors are often willing to settle condemnation cases by allowing amounts far
in excess of what they consider "market value." Id.
25. See generally Bigham, "Fair Market Value," "Just Compensation," and the
Constitution: A Critical View, 24 VAN',D. L REv. 63 (1970); Bryant, Eminent Domain-
Its Use and Misuse, 39 U. Cur. L. Rav. 259 (1970); Note, Eminent Domain Valuations
in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
26. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Roads v. Bond, 231 Cal. App. 2d 435, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 900 (1964) (all evidence must be considered in determining value; see note 23
supra. But see Kiennan v. Chicago, S.F. & C.R.R., 123 Ill. 188 (1887).
27. See text accompanying notes 3 & 4 supra.
28. - R.I. at -, 294 A.2d at 387.
29. See note 6 supra.
30. This inconsistency is discussed in 4 WiGMoRE § 1168. No rule exists whereby
the admissibility of evidence is dependent upon whether the evidence can be incorpo-
rated into the record and brought up by the record. Denver, T. & Ft. W.R.R. v.
Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co., 11 Colo. App. 41, 52 P. 224 (1898); Hart v. State, 15
Tex. App. 202 (1883).
31. One writer has characterized the determination of market value as follows:
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value for what it is-a matter of opinion 32 which may reasonably be
based in part on a view of the property.
"The search for 'fair market value' is a snipe hunt carried on at midnight on a moon-
less landscape." Bigham, "Fair Market Value," "Just Compensation," and the Constitu-
tion: A Critical View, 24 VAND. L. REv. 63, 90 (1970).
32. Parks v. Boston, 32 Mass. (15 Pick.) 198 (1834) (Shaw, C.J.). See also 3 B.
JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 1413 (2d ed. J. Henderson 1926).
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